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This paper proposes to estimate the eects of monetary policy shocks by
a new \agnostic" method, imposing sign restrictions on the impulse responses
of prices, nonborrowed reserves and the federal funds rate in response to a
monetary policy shock. No restrictions are imposed on the response of real
GDP to answer the key question in the title. We nd that \contractionary"
monetary policy shocks have an ambiguous eect on real GDP. Otherwise, the
results found in the empirical VAR literature so far are largely conrmed. The
results could be paraphrased as a new Keynesian-new classical synthesis: even
though the general price level is sticky for a period of about a year, money may
well be close to neutral.
We provide a counterfactual analysis of the early 80's, setting the monetary
policy shocks to zero after December 1979, and recalculating the data. We
found that the dierences between observed real GDP and counterfactually
calculated real GDP was not very large. Thus, the label \Volcker-recession"
for the two recessions in the early 80's appears to be misplaced.1 Introduction
What are the eects of monetary policy on output? This key question has been
the focus of a substantial body of the literature. And the answer seems easy. The
\Volcker recessions" at the beginning of the 80's have shown just how deep a recession
a sudden tightening of monetary policy can produce. Alternatively, look at gure 1,
which juxtaposes movements in the Federal Funds Rate from 1965 to 1996 with
growth rates in real GDP, ﬂipped upside-down for easier comparison. In particular
for the rst half of that sample, it is striking, how rises in the Federal Funds Rate are
followed by falls in output (visible as rises in the dotted line, due to the upside-down
ﬂipping). This issue is closed.
Or is it? Eyeball econometrics such as gure 1 or case studies like the Volcker
recessions can be deceptive: many things are going on simultaneously in the economy,
and one may want to be careful to consider just a single cause-and-eect story. If
the answer really is so obvious, it should emerge equally clearly from an analysis of
multiple time series, which allows for additional channels of interaction and other
explanations, at least in principle. Thus, many researchers have followed the lead of
Sims (1972,1980,1986) and proceeded to analyze the key question in the title with
the aid of vector autoregressions. Rapid progress has been made in the last ten
years. Moving beyond a bivariate money-output structure, the federal funds rate in
particular was recognized to be useful for gauging the stance of monetary policy, see
Bernanke and Blinder (1992). The `price puzzle', raised by Sims (1992), and other
anomalies led to further renements in the identication schemes and the inclusions
of variables such as nonborrowed reserves, total reserves as well as a commodity price
index in these VAR studies, see e.g. Eichenbaum (1992), Strongin (1992), Christiano
and Eichenbaum (1992a,b), Leeper and Gordon (1992), Gordon and Leeper (1994),
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1994, 1996a). Recently, Bernanke and Mihov
(1996a,b) have reconciled a number of these approaches in a unifying framework, and
Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996) have summarized the current state of the literature,
while adding new directions on their own. Additional excellent surveys are in Canova
(1995) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997).
There seems to be a growing agreement, that this literature has reached a healthy
state: many \puzzles" have been resolved, and there are now a variety of identication
schemes to choose from which make the impulse responses to a monetary policy
shock look \reasonable". Based on these results, researchers have begun to develop
theoretical models which replicate the ndings of the VAR literature, aiming at a
unied theory of both, see e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996b,1996c,1997)
or Leeper and Sims (1994). In fact, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996c)
state directly, that \plausible models of the monetary transmission mechanism should
be consistent with at least the following facts about the eects of a contractionary
monetary policy shock: (i) Aggregate price level initially responds very little, (ii)
Aggregate output falls, (iii) Interest rates initially rise, (iv) real wages decline by
a modest amount, (v) prots fall." The conclusions of these authors, that these
1postulates are indeed \facts" stems from their analysis of the time series evidence,
following and extending Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996a). In summary,
this literature indeed reinforces the view emerging from the rst simple look at the
data as in gure 1.
We shall not dispute that the progress made hitherto has been great and that these
conclusions are comforting. But perhaps a note of caution is appropriate nonetheless.
There seems to be a degree of circularity in the way the literature currently draws its
conclusions. A grossly oversimplied and satirized version of the style of argumenta-
tion runs as follows. According to many undergraduate textbooks in macroeconomics,
a monetary contraction should raise the federal funds rate, lower prices and reduce
real output. If a particular identication scheme does not accomplish this, then the
observed responses are dubbed a \puzzle", and the search continues. If an identi-
cation scheme succeeds in matching undergraduate textbook intuition, it is called a
success1. An argument is then made, that the identication scheme looks reasonable
for some other reason by pointing, say, to the operating procedures of the Federal
Reserve System, or by pointing to favourable comparisons to other modes of analysis
such as Romer and Romer (1989,1990) or Boschen and Mills (1991). Finally, the
estimated impulse responses, which happen to accord with undergraduate textbook
intuition, are reported as \facts" about the monetary transmission mechanism, which
a good theory ought to capture, see the quote of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(1996c) above. There is a danger here that we just get out what we have stuck in,
albeit a bit more polished and with numbers attached: namely the undergraduate
textbook intuition. Gali (1992) therefore directly asks, whether the \IS-LM model
t[s] the postwar U.S. data" rather than indirectly presuming that this is the only
model worth tting2. There could be scope for asking whether monetary neutrality
ts the postwar U.S. data as well: so far, the literature has not done that3.
Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996) defend this somewhat circular reasoning by arguing
for the reasonableness of impulse responses as an \informal" identication criterion:
\We use it informally, in that we focus attention on results that do not produce
implausible impulse responses. Our criterion for plausibility is loose. We do not
expect to see strongly positive responses from prices, output, or monetary aggregates
to monetary contraction, nor strongly negative responses from interest rates. ... Our
procedure diers from the standard practice of empirical researchers in economics only
in being less apologetic. Economists adjust their models until they both t the data
and give `reasonable' results. There is nothing unscientic or dishonest about this."
This paper proposes to push this idea all the way, and to identify the eects of
monetary policy shocks via an \agnostic" method solely by directly imposing sign
restrictions on the impulse responses of prices, nonborrowed reserves and the federal
1What is described here is a specication search, see also Leamer (1978)
2See also the work by Gerlach and Smets, 1995.
3It should be noted, however, that most authors do nd, that monetary policy shocks explain
only a modest fraction of the output ﬂuctuations. Many estimates are in the ballpark of 20 percent
or less, see e.g. Cochrane(1994), Kim (1996) and Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996).
2funds rate in response to a monetary policy shock. Importantly, no restrictions are
imposed on the response of real GDP. Thus, the central question in the title is left
agnostically open: we will let the data decide. More specically, we will assume that
a \contractionary" monetary policy shock leads to no increase in prices, no increase
in nonborrowed reserves, and no decrease in the federal funds rate for a certain period
like six months, say, following a shock. While theories with dierent implications can
fairly easily be constructed, these assumptions may enjoy broad support and in any
case, are usually tacitly assumed in most of the VAR literature: our aim is to bring
them directly out into the open and to make them subject to debate. By making
them the sole tool for identifying monetary policy shocks, we avoid the often fragile
assumptions about the timing of contemporaneous shocks, which permeates much of
the identication discussions in the literature. The goal is to help break the circular
reasoning in the literature pointed out above, and to deepen our understanding of
the monetary transmission process as a result.
This will not be a free lunch, nor should one expect it to be. When imposing
the sign restrictions, one needs to take a stand on for how long these restrictions
ought to hold after a shock. Furthermore, one needs to take a stand on whether
a strong response in the opposite direction is more desirable than a weak one. We
will try out a variety of choices and look at the answers. We view these choices as
proceeding along economically meaningful criteria and thus as an advantage over the
usual \timing-of-shocks" discussions.
We nd the following.
1. \Contractionary" monetary policy shocks have an ambiguous eect on real
GDP. With 2/3 probability, a typical shock will move real GDP by up to 0:2
percent4, consistent with the conventional view, but also consistent with e.g.
monetary neutrality. Monetary policy shocks account for probably less than
twentyve percent of the k-step ahead prediction error variance of real output,
and may easily account for less than three percent.
2. The GDP price deﬂator falls only slowly following a contractionary monetary
policy shock, possibly indicating price stickiness. The commodity price index
falls more quickly.
3. We also nd, that monetary policy shocks account for only a small fraction of
the forecast error variance in the federal funds rate, except at horizons shorter
than half a year, as well as for prices.
While these observations conrm some of the results found in the empirical VAR
literature so far, there are also some potentially important dierences in particular
with respect to our key question: \contractionary" monetary policy shocks do not
necessarily seem to have contractionary eects on real GDP. The results could be
paraphrased as a new Keynesian-new classical synthesis: even though the general
4The usual label \contractionary" may thus be misleading, if output is moved up.
3price level is sticky for a period of about a year, money may well be close to neutral.
Our conclusion from these results: one should feel less comfortable with the conven-
tional view and the current consensus of the VAR literature than has been the case
so far.
We provide a counterfactual analysis of the early 80's, setting the monetary policy
shocks to zero after December 1979, and recalculating the data. We found that the
dierences between observed real GDP and counterfactually calculated real GDP was
not very large. Thus, the label \Volcker-recession" for the two recessions in the early
80's appears to be misplaced.
The new method introduced here is somewhat related to work by Lippi and Re-
ichlin (1994a,b), Blanchard and Quah (1989), Faust (1999) or Dwyer (1997): these
authors also impose restrictions on the impulse responses to particular shocks. How-
ever, here, we are just interested in the response to a monetary policy shock in a
system with a number of variables. Also, we do not impose a particular shape of
the impulse response as in Lippi and Reichlin (1994a) or Dwyer (1997). Instead, we
are content with restrictions on the sign, making for substantial dierences between
their approach and ours. The approach here is also in the spirit of Bernanke and
Mihov (1996a,b) in that we do not aim at a complete decomposition of the one-step
ahead prediction error into all its components due to underlying structural shocks,
but rather concentrate on identifying only one such shock, namely the shock to mon-
etary policy. However, we achieve this solely by restricting the sign of the impulse
responses directly.
Section 2 introduces the method with most of the technicalities postponed to
the appendix A. Section 3 shows some results, based on the data set provided by
Bernanke and Mihov (1996a,b). Section 4 provides a counterfactual analysis of the
\Volcker recessions". Finally, section 5 concludes.
2T h e M e t h o d
There is not much disagreement about how to estimate5 VARs. A VAR is given by6
Yt = B(1)Yt−1 + B(2)Yt−2 + :::+B (l)Y t−l+u t;t=1 ;:::;T (1)
where Yt is a m1 vector of data at date t =1−l;:::;T,B (i)are coecient matrices
of size m  m and ut is the one-step ahead prediction error with variance-covariance
matrix .
5There is some, but it is of lesser importance. Here, we have used a Bayesian procedure, in line
with, say, Sims and Zha (1995,96) as well as practially the entire literature which relies on RATS
to produce error bands for impulse responses, see Doan (1992), Example 10.1. For further details
relevant to this paper, see appendix B.
6We have excluded a constant as well as a trend term here as is common in large parts of the
literature. They are easily included, see the appendix in Uhlig (1994) for details.
4The disagreement starts when discussing, how to decompose the prediction er-
ror ut into economically meaningful or \fundamental" innovations. This is necessary
because one is typically interested in examining the impulse responses to such funda-
mental innovations, given the estimated VAR. In particular, much of the literature is
interested in examining the impulse responses to a monetary policy innovation.
Suppose that there are a total of m fundamental innovations, which are mutually
independent and normalized to be of variance 1: they can therefore be written as a
vector v of size m  1w i t hE [ vv0]=I m. What is needed is to nd a matrix A such
that ut = Avt.T h ej - t hc o l u m no fA(or its negative) then represents the immediate
impact on all variables of the j-th fundamental innovation, one standard error in size.
The only restriction on A thus far emerges from the covariance structure:







Simple accounting shows that there are m(m−1)=2 \degrees of freedom" in specifying
A, and hence, further restrictions are needed to achieve identication. Usually, these
restrictions come from one of three procedures: from choosing A to be a Cholesky-
factor of  and implying a recursive ordering of the variables as in Sims (1986), from
some \structural" relationships between the fundamental innovations vt;i;i=1 ;:::;m
and the one-step ahead prediction errors ut;i;i =1 ;:::;m as in Bernanke (1986),
Blanchard and Watson (1986) or Sims (1986), or from separating transitory from
permanent components as in Blanchard and Quah (1989).
Here, we propose to proceed dierently. We start from the observation, that much
of the literature has taken the trouble of identifying all m fundamental innovations,
although this is usually more than one is interested in. In particular for our pur-
poses here, we are solely interested in the response to a monetary policy shock: we
have no desire to also decompose the \other m − 1" components. Bernanke and Mi-
hov (1996a,b) recognize this, and use a block-recursive ordering, to concentrate the
identication exercise on only a limited set of variables which interact with the policy
shock.
We propose to go all the way by only concentrating on nding the innovation
corresponding to the monetary policy shock. This amounts to nding a single column
a 2 I R
m of the matrix A in equation (2), which satises some restrictions one might
want to impose for identifying monetary policy shocks. It is useful to state a formal
denition:
Denition 1 The vector a 2 I R
m is called an impulse vector, i there is some
matrix A, so that AA0 =and so that a is a column of A.
Proposition 1 in appendix A shows, that any impulse vector a can be characterized
as follows. Let xi;i =1 ;:::;m be the eigenvectors of , normalized to form an
orthonormal basis of I R
m.L e t  i ;i =1 ;:::;m be the corresponding eigenvalues.
Then, a is an impulse vector if and only if there are coecients i;i=1 ;:::;mwith
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Given an impulse vector a, it is easy to calculate the appropriate impulse response,
see appendix B for details. Further, nd a vector ~ b 6=0w i t h
( − aa0)~ b =0





is the scale of the shock at date t in the direction of the impulse vector a,a n dv
( a )
t a
is the part of ut which is attributable to that impulse vector. With these tools, one
can perform variance decompositions or counterfactual experiments.
To identify the impulse vector corresponding to monetary policy shocks, we im-
pose, that a contractionary policy shock does not lead to an increase in prices or
in nonborrowed reserves and does not lead to a decrease in the federal funds rate.
These assumptions seem to be the least controversial implications of a contractionary
monetary policy shock. Furthermore and crucially, these seem to be distinguishing
characteristics of monetary policy shocks: it is hard to think of other shocks promi-
nently proposed in the literature, which have the same implications.
The work lies in making these requirements precise. We shall pursue two related,
but dierent approaches.
The pure-sign-restriction approach. Choose a horizon K  0. Take a joint draw
from both the posterior for the VAR parameters as well as a uniform distribution
over the (m-1)-dimensional sphere (1;:::; m−1);
P
 2
i = 1. Construct the
impulse vector a, see equation (3) and calculate the impulse responses rk;j at
horizon k =0 ;:::;K for the variables j, representing the GDP deﬂator, the
commodity price index, nonborrowed reserves and the federal funds rate. If all
these impulse responses satisfy the sign restrictions, keep the draw. Otherwise
discard it. Repeat suciently often. Calculate statistics, based on the draws
kept.




x if x  0
100  x if x  0 ;
which penalizes positive responses in linear proportion and rewards negative
responses in linear proportion, albeit at a slope 100 times smaller than the
slope for penalties on the positive side7. For the true VAR coecients, let
7Other choices for the penalty function are easy to conceive of. Analyzing the sensitivity to this
choice is desirable and the topic of ongoingresearch, but is focussing on the econometric methodology
of the method, and not the subject of this paper.
6rk;j;k=0 ;:::;K be the impulse response of variable j and j be the standard
deviation of the rst dierence of the series for variablej.L e t j=− 1, if j is the
index of the Federal Funds Rate in the data vector, and else, let j =1 .Dene
the monetary policy impulse vector as that impulse vector a, which minimizes
the total penalty Ψ(a) for prices, nonborrowed reserves and (after ﬂipping signs)
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The rescaling by j is necessary to make the deviations across dierent impulse
responses comparable to each other. Note that the sign of the penalty direction
is ﬂipped for the Federal Funds Rate. Since the true VAR is not known, nd
the monetary policy impulse vector for each draw from the posterior. This
requires numerical minimization, see appendix B for details. Keep all draws and
accordingly calculated monetary policy impulse vectors, and calculate statistics
based on these.
The pure-sign-restriction approach is \cleaner" in that it literally only imposes the
sign restrictions: it does not require a somewhat arbitrary additional penalty function.
As a drawback, the pure-sign-restriction is, in eect, simultaneously an estimation of
the reduced-form VAR alongside the impulse vector: VAR parameter draws, which do
not permit any impulse vector to satisfy the imposed sign restrictions, are discarded
as \impossible". By contrast, the penalty-function approach leaves the reduced-form
VAR untouched. Furthermore, it additionally prefers a large response away from the
sign restriction to a small one, and it will typically identify a unique monetary policy
impulse vector for any given VAR, rather than a range or none as in the pure-sign-
restriction approach.
3 Results
In this section, we present some results, using our method. We have employed the
data set used in Bernanke and Mihov (1996a,b), which contains the GDP, the GDP
deﬂator, a commodity price index, total reserves, nonborrowed reservesand the federal
funds rate for the U.S. at monthly frequencies from January 1965 to December 1996.
To obtain monthly observations for all these series, some interpolation was required,
see Bernanke and Mihov (1996a) and in particular their NBER 1995 working paper
version for details. We have tted a VAR with 12 lags in levels of the logs of the series
except for using the federal funds rate directly. We did not include a constant or a
7time trend. We used samples from the posterior to draw inferences, see appendix B
for details.
For comparison, gure 2 shows results obtained from a \traditional" Cholesky
decomposition of , i.e. imposing lower triangularity on A. The Cholesky decompo-
sition is popular in the literature because it is easy to compute. This method requires
a choice regarding the ordering of the variables as well as the choice of the variable,
whose innovations are to be interpreted as monetary policy shocks. Here, we identify
the monetary policy shock with the innovations in the Federal Funds Rate ordered
last. Put dierently, with this identication, monetary policy shocks are assumed
have an instantaneous eect only on the Federal Funds Rate (and to be the only
shock to satisfy this).
Figure 2 shows impulse responses for a horizon of up to ve years after the shock.
The top rows contain the results for real GDP and total reserves, the middle row
contains the results for the GDP price deﬂator and for nonborrowed reserves and
the bottom row contains the results for the commodity price index and the federal
funds rate. Here as well as in all other plots, we show the median as well as the
16% and the 84% quantiles for the sample of impulse responses: if the distribution
was normal, these quantiles would correspond to a one standard deviation band8.
The results are fairly \reasonable" in that they conrm conventional undergraduate
textbook intuition. The \reasonableness" of gure 2 is not an accident: trying out
all the possibilities of ordering variables and identifying a monetary policy shock, it
should not be too surprising, that one can nd one, which conrms the conventional
wisdom. Without a good defense of the timing implicit in the particular Cholesky de-
composition employed, the results of gure 2 may thus be tainted by the specication
search described in the introduction.
One can also see the \price puzzle" pointed out by Sims (1992): the GDP de-
ﬂator moves slightly above zero rst before declining below zero after a monetary
policy shock (see also the remarks in appendix B). The two \agnostic" identication
approaches to be employed next will avoid the price puzzle by construction.
3.1 Results for the pure-sign-restriction approach.
Our benchmark result are contained in gure 3, showing the impulse responses from
a pure-sign-restriction approach with K = 5. I.e., the responses of the GDP price
deﬂator, the commodity price index and nonborrowed reserves have been restricted
not to be positive and the federal funds rate not to be negative for the six months
k;k =0 ;:::;5 following the shock. The results can be described as follows:
8A number of authors prefer two standard deviation bands, which would correspond to the 2.3%
and the 97.7% quantiles. But given that we want to report the same statistics in all the gures and
given that we based inference in the pure-sign-restriction approach on only one hundred draws for
computational reasons, we felt that we could not report these quantiles precise enough. Furthermore,
one standard deviation bands are popular in this literature as well.
81. With a 2/3 probability, the impulse response for real GDP is within a 0:2
percent condence band around zero.
2. The GDP price deﬂator reacts very sluggishly, with prices dropping by about
0.2 percent within a year, and dropping by 0.5 percent within ve years. The
price puzzle is avoided by construction.
3. The commodity price index reacts swiftly, reaching a plateau of a 1.5 percent
drop after about one year.
4. The Federal Funds Rate reacts large and positively immediately, typically rising
by 30 basis points, then reversing course within a year, ultimately dropping by
10 basis points.
5. Nonborrowed reserves and total reserves both drop initially, with nonborrowed
reserves dropping by more (around 0.5 percent) than total reserves (around 0.2
percent). After one to two years, a reversal sets in with reserves eventually
expanding by around 0.4 percent.
The initial 6-months response for most of these variables look rather conventional
except for real GDP. Indeed, one may conclude from this gure that the reaction of
real GDP can as easily be positive as negative following a \contractionary" shock.
While this is consistent with the textbook view of declining output after a monetary
policy shock, the data does not seem to urge this view upon us. The answer to the
opening question is: the eects of monetary policy shocks on real output are ambigu-
ous. A one-standard deviation monetary policy shock may leave output unchanged
or may drive output up or down by up to 0.2 percent in most cases, thus possibly
triggering fairly sizeable movements of unknown sign.
The further course of all the responses looks perhaps less conventional, although
not hard to explain. Here are some suggestions. Commodity prices react more quickly
than the GDP deﬂator, since commodities are traded on markets with very ﬂexible
prices. As for reserves and interest rates, note that these impulse responses contain
the endogenous reaction of monetary policy to its own shocks. The Federal Funds
Rate reverses course and turns negative for perhaps one of the following two reason.
First, this may reﬂect that monetary policy shocks really arise as errors of assessment
of the economic situation by the Federal Reserve Bank. The Fed may typically try to
keep the steering wheel steady: should they accidentally make an error and \shock"
the economy, they will try to reverse course soon afterwards. Second, this may reﬂect
a reversal from a liquidity eect to a Fisherian eect: with inﬂation declining, a
decline in the nominal rate may nonetheless indicate a rise in the real rate. Looking
at the responses of reserves, we favor the rst view. Obviously, other reasonable
interpretations can be found.
This identication of the monetary policy shock seems appealingly clean to us
as it only makes use of a priori appealing and consensual views about the eects of
9monetary policy shocks on prices, reserves and interest rates. There is one degree of
choice here, though: the horizon K for the sign restrictions. How precise does this
horizon need to be specied, i.e. how sensitive are the results to changes in K?T h e
answer is provided in gure 4, showing the impulse response functions for real GDP,
when imposing a variety of choices for K. The left column shows the results for a
3-months (K=2) and a 6-months (K=5) horizon, while the right column shows the
results for a 12-months (K=11) and a 24-months (K=23) horizon. The variation is
remarkably moderate: essentially, all of these gures show again an error band of
0:2 percent around zero. As one moves from shorter to longer horizons K,t h a t
band seems to move up somewhat, however. A short-lived liquidity eect is better
for the conventional view.
3.2 Results from the penalty-function approach.
Figures 5 and 6 provide the same results, now using the penalty-function approach
rather than the pure-sign-restriction approach. First, compare the results for the
6-months horizon, K = 5, when using the penalty function approach in gure 5 to
those of the pure-sign-restriction approach in gure 3. The results look qualitatively
largely the same. The magnitudes are slightly larger, and the condence bands some-
what sharper, in particular immediately after the shock, compared to the pure-sign
restriction approach. The greatest dierence obtains for the impulse response for real
GDP, i.e. for our central question. Here, one can perhaps see some evidence for the
conventional view: real output, after a short initial and puzzling increase by around
0.05 percent, then declines by a tenth of a percent or more within a year, on average
gradually recovering after that.
The dierences betweenthese two approaches in gures 3 and 5 are easy to explain.
While the pure-sign-restriction approach is very agnostic about the size of the impulse
response away from the sign restriction, a larger responses is \rewarded" by the
penalty-function approach at least as long as this does not generate sign-violations
elsewhere. Instead of a range of impulse vectors consistent with the sign restriction,
the penalty function approach seeks a unique monetary policy impulse vector by
searching e.g. for a large initial reaction of the Federal Funds Rate. Indeed, this
reaction is now fairly sharply estimated to be about 30 basis points, quickly rising
by another 10 basis points. One obtains similarly sharp error bands elsewhere. The
monetary policy impulse vector uniquely identied by the penalty function is an
element in the set of the vectors admitted by the pure-sign-restriction approach,
given a draw for the VAR coecients, provided that set is not empty. One would
therefore expect the range of impulse responses of the penalty function approach to
be contained in the range of impulse responses of the pure-sign-restriction approach.
Indeed, this seems to be the case: the 64% range for the real GDP response, for
example, never seems to venture outside the 0:2 percent error band around zero
calculated for the pure-sign-restriction approach.
One can thus either view the results in gure 5 as a sharpening of the results in
10gure 3, due to additionally desirable properties imposed on the restricted impulse
responses, or as a distortion of the results in gure 3 due to additional ad-hoc restric-
tions. Since the aim is to impose the sign restrictions and nothing else, we nd the
pure-sign-restriction approach to be more appealing. The results of the second ap-
proach are nonetheless informative in that they show the additional mileage obtained
from additional, potentially desirable restrictions, opening the door to more detailed
investigations.
The results of the penalty function approach are also more sensitive to the choice
of the restriction horizon K, as a comparison of gure 6 with gure 4 shows. This is
not surprising: as the restriction horizon increases, it is increasingly harder to keep
the sign restrictions satised. With increasing k, the search for the monetary policy
impulse vector increasingly seeks to avoid penalties for sign violations rather than
rewards for movements in the opposite direction. The 64% percent condence band
for the penalty-function approach keeps staying in the 0:2 percent band, and again
moves up into positive ranges with larger K: in fact, the results for a 24-month horizon
(K=23) practically rules out the conventional view. This reinforces the conclusion
drawn in the previous subsection, that the conventional view requires a short-lived
liquidity eect or, alternatively, monetary policy shocks as policy errors which are
quickly reversed.
3.3 How much variation do monetary policy shocks explain?
Having identied the monetary policy shock, it is then interesting to nd out, how
much of the variation these shocks explain. What fraction of the unexpected k-step
ahead variance in, say, real GDP, prices and interest rates, are accounted for by
monetary policy shocks? These questions are answered by gure 7 for the benchmark
experiment, i.e. using a pure sign restriction approach with a 6-months restriction
(K=5). Results for the other experiments look fairly similar. The gure shows the
fraction of the k−step ahead variance in the six variables explained by monetary
policy shocks, with the variables ordered as in gure 3.
According to the median estimates, shown as the middle lines in this gure, mone-
tary policy shocks account for 10 percent of the variations in real GDP at all horizons,
for up to 30 percent of the long-horizon variations in prices and 25 percent of the vari-
ation in interest rates at the short horizon, falling o after that. Explaining just three
or so percent of the real GDP variations at any horizon is within the 64% condence
band: it thus seems fairly likely, that monetary policy has very little eect on real
GDP. This may either be due to monetary policy shocks having little real eect, or
due to a Federal Reserve Bank keeping a steady hand on the wheel, as argued by
Woodford (1994) or Bernanke (1996).
Among the six series, the largest fraction at the long end is explained for prices,
reemphasizing Friedmans dictum, that inﬂation is always and everywhere a mone-
tary phenomenon. For interest rates, the largest fraction of variation explained by
monetary policy is at the short horizon, providing further support to the view, that
11monetary policy shocks are accidental errors by the Federal Reserve Bank, which are
quickly reversed. The remaining variations in prices and interest rates may still be
due to monetary policy, but then it needs to be due to the endogenous part of mone-
tary policy: by systematically responding to shocks elsewhere, monetary policy may
end up being responsible for 100% of the movements in prices. Only 30% percent
of these movements can directly be ascribed to shocks generated by monetary policy
itself. These results are rather similar to the results found in the empirical VAR
literature so far, see the surveys cited in the introduction.
3.4 A summary.
The results could be paraphrased as a new Keynesian-new classical synthesis: even
though the general price level is sticky for a period of about a year (see also Blinder,
1994), monetary policy has ambiguous real eects. These observations largely conrm
the results found in the empirical VAR literature so far, see in particular Leeper,
Sims and Zha (1996), except for the ambiguity regarding the eect on output: this
exception is, of course, a rather important dierence. We also agree with these
authors that it makes sense that variation in monetary policy accounts only for a
small fraction of the variation in any of these variables: good monetary policy should
be predictable policy, and from that perspective, monetary policy in the US during
this time span has been successful indeed.
4 The Volcker recessions, which weren't.
So, what about the Volcker recessions at the beginning of 1980? In August 1979, Paul
Volcker became chairman of the Federal Reserve: in order to quelch inﬂation, he let
interest rates rise to unprecedented levels, plunging the economy into two deep reces-
sions as a result. At least, this is the usual story, see e.g. Krugman (1990). Shouldn't
this case study be viewed as sucient evidence that monetary policy surprises can
have dramatic real eects?
With our results, one can analyze this issue by providing a counterfactual analysis.
To do so, we set all the monetary policy shocks to zero, after Volckerbecame chairmen
in August 1979, i.e. we simulated the VAR, using ut − v
(a)
t a rather than ut as date-t
one-step ahead prediction error, where v
(a)
t is the scale of the monetary policy shock
at date t, see equation (4). In light of the well-known Lucas Critique (1976), one
obviously needs to interpret the results with some caution. Leeper, Sims and Zha
(1996) provide a clear discussion of these issues for the analysis of VAR's.
The results can be seen in gures 8: we have concentrated our focus on real
GDP. The top panel in gure 8 has been based on the pure-sign-restriction approach,
whereas the penalty function approach has been employed for the middle panel: for
both, a 6-months restriction (K = 5) was used. Both gures do not provide support
for the standard story. With the counterfactual experiment, the recessions are some-
12what diminuished, but they certainly do not go away. For comparison, the bottom
panel of gure 8 provides results, when using the \traditional" Cholesky decompo-
sition with the Federal Funds Rate ordered last: even with this identication, the
rst recession cannot be attributed to monetary policy shocks, although perhaps the
second recession might be.
In sum, something else but monetary policy shocks must be the explanation for
the recession of 1980 and probably also the recession of 1982: the Volcker recessions
weren't due to Paul Volcker. This answer may appear somewhat unsatisfactory: it
provides a negative answer, not an explanation. This is comparable to a murder trial,
in which the prime suspect is pronounced \not guilty" without having somebody
else provide a confession. Rounding up the other usual suspects is something which
we have explicitely not focussed on in this exercise. There are a number of other
candidates, though. For example, it is remarkably easy to explain the movements in
real GDP in that time period with Hansen's (1985) simple benchmark real business
cycle model, using observed labor productivities as exogenous input for a model
simulation. It is admittedly hard to also explain the large interest rate movements
this way. Some have proposed oil shocks as a leading explanation. Finally, it may
be that the recessions were due to monetary policy, but caused by the endogenous
feedback part of predictably changing interest rates in responses to shocks originating
elsewhere. While blaming monetary policy, an explanation along such lines would
nonetheless have to be quite dierent from the standard story. Whatever the truth:
we believe that the analysis here supports a \not guilty" verdict for monetary policy
shocks as a cause for the 1980 recession, in contrast to the conventional consensus
view.
5 Conclusions
This paper proposed to estimate the eects of monetary policy by a new \agnostic"
method, imposing sign restrictions on the impulse responses of prices, nonborrowed
reserves and the federal funds rate in response to a monetary policy shock. No
restrictions are imposed on the response of real GDP. It turned out that
1. \Contractionary" monetary policy shocks have an ambiguous eect on real
GDP, moving it up or down by up to 0:2 percent with a probability of 2/3.
Monetary policy shocks accounts for probably less than twentyve percent of
the k-step ahead prediction error variance of real output, and may easily account
for less than three percent.
2. The GDP price deﬂator falls only slowly following a contractionary monetary
policy shock, possibly indicating price stickiness. The commodity price index
falls more quickly.
3. Monetary policy shocks account for only a small fraction of the forecast error
variance in the federal funds rate, except at horizons shorter than half a year.
13They account for about one third of the variation in prices at longer horizons.
While these observations conrm some of the results found in the empirical VAR
literature so far, there are also some potentially important dierences in particular
with respect to our key question. \Contractionary" monetary policy shocks do not
necessarily seem to have contractionary eects on real GDP. The results could be
paraphrased as a new Keynesian-new classical synthesis: even though the general
price level is sticky for a period of about a year, money may well be close to neutral.
One should therefore feel less comfortable with the conventional view and the current
consensus of the VAR literature than has been the case so far.
We provided a counterfactual analysis of the early 80's, setting the monetary
policy shocks to zero after December 1979, and recalculating the data. We found
that the dierences between observed real GDP and counterfactually calculated real
GDP was not very large. Thus, the label \Volcker-recession" for the two recessions
in the early 80's appears to be misplaced.
14Appendix
A Characterizing Impulse Vectors
Let u be the one-step ahead prediction error in a VAR of n variables and let v be the
vector of fundamental innovations, related to u via some matrix A,
u = Av
Let  be the variance-covariance matrix of u, assumed to be nonsingular, while the
identity matrix is assumed to be the variance-covariance matrix of v.I f v = e 1 ,
i.e. the vector with zeros everywhere except for its rst entry, equal to unity, then
u = Ae1 equals a1, the rst column of A. Hence, the j-th column of A describes the
j-th \impulse vector", i.e. the representation of an innovation in the j-th structural
variable as a one-step ahead prediction error. Put dierently, the j-th column of A
describes the immediate impact on all variables of an innovation in the j-th structural
variable. Our aim is to characterize all possible impulse vectors. One can do so, using
the observation that any two decompositions  = AA0 and  = ~ A ~ A0 have to satisfy
that
~ A = AQ
for some orthogonal matrix Q, i.e. QQ0 = I, see also Faust (1999) and Uhlig (1999).
We nd the following proposition useful, which we shall prove directly. We follow the
general convention that all vectors are to be interpreted as columns.
Proposition 1 Let  be a positive denite matrix. Let xi;i=1 ;:::;mbe the eigen-
vectors of , normalized to form an orthonormal basis of I R
m.L e t  i ;i =1 ;:::;m
be the corresponding eigenvalues. Let a 2 I R
m be a vector. Then, the following three
statements are equivalent:
1. There are coecients i;i=1 ;:::;mwith
Pm
i=1 2










2. ~ =−aa0 is positive semidenite and singular.
3. The vector a is an impulse vector, i.e., there is some matrix A, so that AA0 =
and so that a is a column of A.









15Note that there are m − 1 \degrees of freedom" in picking an impulse vector,








j i jjjx i jj2;
for example.
Proof: We rst show the equivalence of the rst two statements. Note, that one


































i=1 in I R
m with equality for at least one such (γi)m
i=1 dierent from the
zero vector. It follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, that this is equivalent
Pm
i=1 2
i =1 . To see this, note that the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality generally implies
















with equality for γi  i. Hence, our rst two statements are equivalent.
We show now that the third statement implies the second statement. To that end,








Assume w.l.o.g., that a is the rst column, a = a1. Then, ~ =
P m
i =2 aia0
i,w h i c hi s
positive semidenite and singular, since each of the matrices aia0
i are of rank 1.
16Next, we show that the second statement implies the third. Find the nonzero
eigenvalues ~ i;i=2 ;:::;mand its corresponding eigenvectors ~ xi;i=2 ;:::;mfor the
positive semidenite matrix ~ =−aa0,n o t i n gt h a t~ must be of rank m−1,s i n c e
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q
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i
A simple calculation shows that indeed =AA0.
To see that the third statement implies the last, note that A = ~ AQ for some
matrix Q with QQ0 = I, as remarked before this proposition. The coecients 
can now be found in the rst column of Q. Conversely, given any such vector  of
unit length, complement it to an orthogonal basis to form the matrix Q. Then, let
A = ~ AQ.
This nishes the proof. 
Given an impulse vector a, one would like to calculate the part of the one-step
ahead prediction error ut which is attributable to shocks proportional to that vector.
If the entire matrix A was available and a was the, say, rst column, one would
simply calculate vt = A−1ut and use vt;1 as the scale of the shock attributable to a.
Motivated by this reasoning, dene:
Denition 2 Given an impulse vector a and a one-step ahead prediction error u 2
I R
m, v(a) 2 I R is called the scale of a shock attributable to a, if there exists a matrix A
with A0A = , of which a is the j-th column for some j,s ot h a tv ( a )=( A − 1u ) j.
It turns out that this ties down the scale uniquely, provided  is not singular.
Proposition 2 Given an impulse vector a and a one-step ahead prediction error u,
the scale of the shock v(a) attributable to a is unique and can be calculated as follows.
Let b 2 I R
m solve the two equations
0=(  − aa
0)b
1=b 0 a
The solution b exists and is unique. Then,
v(a) = b
0u
Proof: Suppose, A was available and assume w.l.o.g., that a is its rst column.
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Since  − aa0 is symmetric, this is equivalent to ( − aa0)b =0 . Note, that there
is unique one-dimensional subspace of vectors b satisfying ( − aa0)b =0 ,s i n c e
is assumed to be regular. Also, because  is regular, a0b 6=0for any b 6=0which
satises this equation. Thus, there is a unique b, which also satises b0a =1 .
With v(a) it is now furthermore clear, that the part of u which is attributable to
the shock proportional to the impulse vector a is given by v(a)a.
B Estimation and Inference
For convenience, we collect here the main tools for estimation and inference. We
use a Bayesian approach since it is computationally simple and since it allows for
a conceptually clean way of drawing error bands for statistics of interest such as
impulse responses, see Sims and Zha (1995) for a clear discussion on this point. Note
that draws from the posterior are \candidate truths". Thus, if e.g. the true impulse
response for prices should not violate the imposed sign restriction, then this should
also literally be true for any draw from the posterior. Thus e.g. the \price puzzle"
in gure 2 is a violation by \candidate truths", and worrisome. With a classical
approach, by contrast, considerations of signicance would enter: a violation may be
considered admissable if insignicant, requiring further judgement. Put dierently,
a Bayesian approach is more convenient and cleaner to justify. The reader who
rather wishes to pursue a classical approach and inference regarding impulse response
functions in vector autoregressions is referred to the work by Mittnik and Zadrozny
(1993) as well as Kilian (1996a,b,c).
Using monthly data, we xed the number of lags at l = 12 as in Bernanke and
Mihov (1996a,1996b). Stack the system (1) as
Y = XB + u (6)
18where Xt =[ Y0
t − 1;Y0
t−2;:::;Y0
t−l] 0,Y=[ Y 1;:::;Y T] 0;X=[ X 1;:::;X T] 0,u=[ u 1;:::;u T] 0
and B =[ B (1);:::;B (l)] 0. To compute the impulse response to an impulse vector a,




I m ( l − 1) 0m(l−1);m
#
and compute rk;j =( Γ ka ) j;k=0 ;1 ;2 ;:::to get the response of variable j at horizon
k. The variance of the k-step ahead forecast error due to an impulse vector a is
obtained by simply squaring its impulse responses. Summing again over all aj,w h e r e
a j is the j-th column of some matrix A with AA0 =  delivers the total variance of
the k-step ahead forecast error.
We assume that the ut's are independent and normally distributed. The MLE for
(B;) is given by
^ B =( X 0X ) − 1X 0Y ;^ =
1
T
( Y−X^ B )
0( Y−X^ B )( 7 )
Our prior and posterior for (B;) belongs to the Normal-Wishart family, whose
properties are further discussed in Uhlig (1994). A proper Normal-Wishart distrib-
ution is parameterized by a \mean coecient" matrix  B of size k  m,ap o s i t i v e
denite \mean covariance" matrix S of size m  m as well as a positive denite ma-
trix N of size l  l and a \degrees of freedom" real number   0t od e s c r i b et h e
uncertainty about (B;) around (  B;S). The Normal-Wishart distribution species,
that −1 follows a Wishart distribution9 Wm(S−1=;)w i t hE [−1]=S − 1,a n dt h a t ,
conditionally on , the coecient matrix in its columnwise vectorized form, vec(B)
follows a Normal distribution N(vec(  B); ⊗ N−1).
Proposition 1 on p. 670 in Uhlig (1994) states, that if the prior is described by
 B0, N0, S0 and 0, then the posterior is desribed by  BT, NT, ST and T,w h e r e
 T = T+ 0
N T = N 0+X
0X
 B T = N
− 1















0X (^ B−  B 0)
We use a \weak" prior, and use N0 =0 , 0=0 ,S 0and  B0 arbitrary. Then,  BT = ^ B,
ST = ^ , T = T, NT = X0X, which is also the form of the posterior used in the
RATS manual for drawing error bands, see example 10.1 in Doan (1992).
No attempt has been made to impose more specic prior knowledge such as the
\no change forecast" of the Minnesota prior, see Doan, Litterman and Sims (1984),
9To draw from this distribution, use e.g.  = (R  R0)−1,w h e r eRis a m   matrix with
each column an independent draw from a Normal distribution N(0;S −1=) with mean zero and
variance-covariance matrix S−1.
19special treatments of roots near unity, see the discussion in Sims and Uhlig (1991) as
well as Uhlig (1994), or to impose the more sophisticated priors of Leeper, Sims and
Zha (1996) or Sims and Zha (1996). Also, we have not experimented with regime-
switching as in Bernanke and Mihov (1996a,b) or with stochastic volatility as in
Uhlig (1997).
B.1 The pure-sign-restriction approach
To draw inferences from the posterior for the pure-sign-restriction approach, we take
n1 draws from the VAR posterior and, for each of these draws n2 draws  from the
m-dimensional unit sphere. From  and , we construct the impulse vector, using the
characterization (3) or, alternatively, the forth characterization in proposition 1 with
~ A the Cholesky decomposition. For each draw, we calculate the impulse responses,
and check, whether the sign restrictions are satised. If they are, we keep the draw.
If not, we proceed to the next. Finally, error bands etc. are calculated, using all the
draws which have been kept. For the calculations, we have chosen n1 = n2 and high
enough, so that a couple of hundred joint draws satised the sign restriction. E.g. for
the sixth months restriction (K =5 ) ,w eu s e dn 1=n 2= 200.
B.2 The penalty-function approach
To draw inference from the posterior for the penalty function approach, we take n
draws from it, employing a Monte-Carlo method: because optimizing over the shape
of the impulse responses is time-consuming, we usually took n = 100. For each of
these draws, we calculate the impulse responses and the variance decomposition and
collect them. Thus, after 100 draws, we have 100 draws for each point on an impulse
response function we may wish to estimate: it is now easy to calculate their median
and their 68% error band.
To do the numerical minimization of the criterion function Ψ for each draw from
the posterior, we needed to parameterize the space of vectors (j)6
j=1 of unit length:






























j=1 2 I R
5
particularly convenient. We have coded all our routines in MATLAB, and used its
general purpose minimizer fmins.m to perform the minimization task numerically. It
turned out that fmins sometimes stopped the search before converging to the optimal
solution: we thus performed fmins.m three times in a row, starting it rst at a
randomly selected (γj)5
j=1 2 I R
5 and then starting it successively at the previously
20found optimum. Now, the minimization seemed to miss the minimum in safely less
than 5 percent of all cases. To achieve near-certain convergence, we did this procedure
twice, starting it from two dierent initial random vectors (γj)5
j=1 2 I R
5, and selecting
the best of the two minimas found. That way, the chance of missing the optimum
was safely below 0.3 percent. To calculate this for a single draw from the posterior
took around four minutes on a Pentium-based machine. We used a sample of 100
draws from the posterior for inference.
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25Figures
26Figure 1: This gure contrasts movments in the Federal Funds Rate, shown as a
thick, solid line with the scale on the left, with real GDP growth rates, shown as a
thinner, dotted line with the scale on the right. To aid the visual comparison, the
real GDP growth rates have been put \upside down", i.e., peaks in the gure are
actually particularly low values for the growth rate. \Eyeball econometrics" suggests
a strong cause-and-eect from Federal Funds Rate movements to real GDP: whenever
interest rates rise, growth rates fall (i.e. the dotted line rises) shortly afterwards.
This is particularly visible for 1968 through 1983. It seems easy to conclude from this
picture, that the question about the eects of monetary policy on output is answered
clearly: contractionary monetary policy leads to contractions in real GDP.










































































































Figure 2: Impulse responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock one standard
deviation in size, identied as the innovation in the Federal Funds Rate ordered last in
a Cholesky decomposition. This \conventional" identication exercise is provided for
comparison. The three lines are the 16% quantile, the median and the 16% quantile of
the posterior distribution. The rst column shows the responses of real GDP, the GDP
deﬂator and the commodity price index. The second column shows the responses of
total reserves, nonborrowed reserves, and the Federal Funds Rate. This identication
mostly generates \reasonable" results, but also the price puzzle: the GDP deﬂator
rises rst before falling.



















































































































Figure 3: Impulse responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock one standard
deviation in size, using the pure-sign-restriction approach with K =5 . I.e., the
responses of the GDP price deﬂator, the commodity price index and nonborrowed
reserves have been restricted not to be positive and the federal funds rate not to be
negative for months k;k =0 ;:::;5 after the shock. The impulse response for real
GDP is a 0:2 percent condence band around zero: while consistent with the textbook
view of declining output after a monetary policy shock, it is also consistent with e.g.
monetary neutrality.












































































Figure 4: Impulse responses of real GDP to a contractionary monetary policy shock
one standard deviation in size, using the pure-sign-restriction approach. For the left
column, K =2and K =5were used, whereas K =1 1and K =2 3have been used in
the right column. Essentially, all of these gures show again an error band of 0:2
percent around zero. As one moves from shorter to longer horizons K, that band
seems to move up. Overall, the evidence in favor of the conventional view of a fall in
output after a \contractionary" monetary policy shock seems to weak at best.
















































































































Figure 5: Impulse responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock one standard
deviation in size, using the penalty-function approach with K =5 . I.e., the responses
of the GDP price deﬂator, the commodity price index, nonborrowed reserves and the
negative of the Federal Funds Rate have been penalized for positive values and slightly
rewarded for negative values in the months k;k =0 ;:::;5 following the shock: the
shock was identied by minimizing total penalties. The error bands are now much
sharper than in gure 3. While the real GDP response is still within the 0:2 error
band around zero estimated before, there now seems to be a piece between one and 12
month, showing a conventional response.








































































Figure 6: Impulse responses of real GDP to a contractionary monetary policy shock
one standard deviation in size, using the penalty-function approach, imposing sign
restriction for the months k =0 ;:::;K after the shock. For the left column, K =2
and K =5were used, whereas K =1 1and K =2 3have been used in the right
column. Compared to gure 4, the results are now sharper, but also more sensitive
to variations in K. Only low values of K are fairly consistent with the conventional
view of a decline in real GDP following a \contractionary" monetary policy shock.
















































































































Figure 7: These plots show the fraction of the k-step ahead forecast error variance
explained by a monetary shock, using a pure-sign restriction approach with K =5 ,a s
in gure 3. The three lines are the 16% quantile, the median and the 16% quantile of
the posterior distribution. According to the median estimates, monetary policy shocks
account for 10 percent of the variations in real GDP at all horizons, for up to 30
percent of the long-horizon variations in prices and for 25 percent of the variation in
interest rates at the short horizon, falling o after that.





































































































Figure 8: These plots compare the actual data for real GDP to a \counterfactual"
experiment, in which it is assumed that there hadn't been any monetary policy shocks
after Volcker became the chairman of the Federal Reserve: all monetary policy shocks
after August 1979 have been set to zero. For the top gure, the pure-sign-restriction
approach has been used, whereas the penalty-function approach was taken for the mid-
dle gure, both with K =5 . The bottom gure has been calculated from a Cholesky
decomposition with monetary policy shocks identied as innovations in the Federal
Funds Rate ordered last. Note that certainly the 1980 recession does not disappear in
any of these three plots.
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